nprasad2077/codebase-memory-mcp

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Martin Vogel aa2b60be7d Fix 29 CodeQL alerts: command injection, snprintf overflow, TOCTOU races

- Command injection (CRITICAL): validate shell args before system() in
  update command's unzip and version-check calls
- TOCTOU cli.c: use open(O_CREAT, 0755) + fdopen() to set permissions
  atomically instead of fopen() + chmod() after close
- TOCTOU pass_envscan.c: open file first, then fstat() on fd to check
  size, eliminating stat-then-open race window
- Overflowing snprintf (11 locations): clamp offset after each append
  to prevent unsigned underflow on truncation in cypher.c, store.c,
  http_server.c, test_c_lsp.c
- Add CBM_SNPRINTF_APPEND macro in str_util.h for future safe appends
- CodeQL: remove pull_request trigger (only scan push to main)
- CodeQL gate: increase timeout from 30 to 45 minutes
- Add fuzz testing script (random JSON-RPC + Cypher mutations)
- 12 Scorecard governance alerts dismissed (not code vulnerabilities)

2026-03-21 22:18:31 +01:00

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Security Policy

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:

Do NOT open a public issue for security vulnerabilities
Email: martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com
Include: description, reproduction steps, affected version, potential impact

We will acknowledge your report within 48 hours and provide a fix timeline within 7 days.

Security Measures

This project implements multiple layers of security verification. Every release binary must pass all checks before users can download it (draft → verify → publish flow).

Build-Time (CI — every commit)

8-layer security audit suite runs on every build:
- Layer 1: Static allow-list for dangerous calls (system/popen/fork) + hardcoded URLs
- Layer 2: Binary string audit (URLs, credentials, dangerous commands)
- Layer 3: Network egress monitoring via strace (Linux)
- Layer 4: Install output path + content validation
- Layer 5: Smoke test hardening (clean shutdown, residual processes, version integrity)
- Layer 6: Graph UI audit (external domains, CORS, server binding, eval/iframe)
- Layer 7: MCP robustness (23 adversarial JSON-RPC payloads)
- Layer 8: Vendored dependency integrity (SHA-256 checksums, dangerous call scan)
All dangerous function calls require a reviewed entry in scripts/security-allowlist.txt
Time-bomb pattern detection — scans for time()/sleep() near dangerous calls (could indicate delayed activation)
MCP tool handler file read audit — tracks file read count in mcp.c against an expected maximum (detects added file reads that could exfiltrate data through tool responses)
CodeQL SAST — static application security testing on every push (taint analysis, CWE detection, data flow tracking). Any open alert blocks the release.
Fuzz testing — random/mutated inputs to MCP server and Cypher parser (60 seconds per build). Catches crashes, segfaults, and memory errors that structured tests miss.
Native antivirus scanning on every platform (any detection fails the build):
- Windows: Windows Defender with ML heuristics — the same engine end users run
- Linux: ClamAV with daily signature updates
- macOS: ClamAV with daily signature updates

Release-Time (draft → verify → publish)

Releases are created as drafts (invisible to users) and only published after all verification passes:

SLSA build provenance — cryptographic attestation proving each binary was built by GitHub Actions from this repository
Sigstore cosign signing — keyless digital signatures verifiable by anyone
SBOM — Software Bill of Materials (CycloneDX) listing all vendored dependencies
SHA-256 checksums — published with every release
VirusTotal scanning — all binaries scanned by 70+ antivirus engines (zero-tolerance: any detection blocks the release)
OpenSSF Scorecard — repository security health score

If ANY antivirus engine flags ANY binary, the release stays as a draft and is not published until the issue is investigated and resolved.

Code-Level Defenses

Shell injection prevention — cbm_validate_shell_arg() rejects metacharacters before all popen()/system() calls
SQLite authorizer — blocks ATTACH/DETACH at engine level (prevents file creation via SQL injection)
CORS locked to localhost — graph UI only accessible from localhost origins
Path containment — realpath() check prevents reading files outside project root
Process-kill restriction — only server-spawned PIDs can be terminated
SHA-256 checksum verification — update command verifies downloaded binary before installing

Verification

Users can independently verify any release binary:

# SLSA provenance (proves binary came from this repo's CI)
gh attestation verify <downloaded-file> --repo DeusData/codebase-memory-mcp

# Sigstore cosign (keyless signature)
cosign verify-blob --bundle <file>.bundle <file>

# SHA-256 checksum
sha256sum -c checksums.txt

# VirusTotal (upload binary or check the report links in the release notes)
# https://www.virustotal.com/

Supported Versions

Version	Supported
0.5.x	Yes
< 0.5	No (Go codebase, superseded by C rewrite)

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