Sentry self-hosted (getsentry/self-hosted 26.8.0) could not be deployed
as a Docker Compose application. Three separate problems blocked it:
- YAML collection aliases: the first fix raised the limit to 256 only in
Application::oldRawParser(). The safety check added in v4.4.0
(validateDockerComposeForInjection) and all other Compose parse calls
still used the Symfony default of 128, so the Sentry file (133 aliases)
failed with "Maximum number of collection aliases (128) exceeded".
Add parseDockerComposeYaml() and use it for every Compose parse.
- Argument list too long: the deployment job sent the generated Compose
file as base64 inside the SSH command. Linux limits one argument to
128 KiB, and the Sentry file is about 370 KB. execute_remote_command()
now accepts an 'input' key that streams content over SSH stdin, and
the job writes the Compose file with it.
- A list-style build arg without a value (build.args: [SENTRY_IMAGE])
merged into a map environment kept its numeric key, so Docker Compose
rejected the file with "non-string key in ...environment: 0". It now
becomes NAME with no value, as in Compose.
Closes#11725
Since aabd12737 a Compose bind volume with a content block had to stay
inside the resource directory. Services and Compose applications saved
in v4.3.23 with other paths, and Git Compose files with them, no longer
started or deployed.
Only admins and owners can edit Compose files, and they can already
write any host file with a plain bind mount, so the rule added no
security.
- Write content files to their host path again, as in v4.3.23
- Keep shell escaping and the safe-character checks on volume sources,
so injection attempts are still rejected
Require deploy or root token access when creating managed mounts outside
resource directories or changing their file contents through the API.
Synchronize KeyDB and Dragonfly passwords with local and shared
REDIS_PASSWORD values while preserving secret manager resolution.
Allow validated host file and directory mounts outside resource directories
while protecting external paths from deletion.
Clean up cancelled deployment containers and clear tracked process IDs.
Preserve legacy KeyDB and Dragonfly password parsing, accept server backup
paths without extension restrictions, and allow Compose variable proxy ports.
A stop or delete no longer queues a full cleanup each time. It skips the
cleanup when one finished on the server in the last hour, and the queued
run only cleans when disk usage is at or above the server cleanup
threshold. The docker_cleanup API flag keeps its default of true.
- References to locked (shown once) shared variables keep their reference
text in the UI, copy action, and API instead of the locked value.
- Remove the saved proxy configuration and validation logs from nested
servers (for example destination.server) in API responses unless the
token can read sensitive data.
- The services list API now applies removeSensitiveData to every service.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A renamed template keeps its old key as an alias, so API callers and
services stored with the old key still find the template.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Try to remove every volume and always delete the configuration
directory (it holds the .env with secrets), then report the volumes that
failed.
- Delete volume backup schedules also when a service is removed from
Coolify only.
- The delete API no longer claims the server is unreachable when the
caller asked to delete from Coolify only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Container ownership labels now use UUIDs: coolify.applicationUuid,
coolify.serviceUuid, coolify.service.subUuid and coolify.databaseUuid.
Numeric ids differ between Coolify instances, so after a server transfer
the target could not find existing containers: redeploys left the old
container running and service statuses were wrong.
Containers are matched by UUID label first, then by the compose project
(Swarm: stack namespace), which is the resource UUID since July 2024, and
last by the older numeric id label. Existing containers keep working
without a redeploy and get the UUID labels on the next deploy or restart.
Container logs and scheduled-task commands and output are now shown only to
users who can edit the resource. The API returns them only to tokens with
the read:sensitive or root ability, the same as the MCP tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Editing a domain (UI application, service and preview domains, the
General form, API application, preview, service, and service
application updates) now releases the hostnames that the edit
removed, like removing a domain does. Records that another live
resource still uses are kept.
- A per-hostname lock (managed-dns:{team}:{hostname}) now covers the
release (re-check, Cloudflare delete, row delete) and the create
paths. A release can no longer delete a record that is being added
again; a busy lock makes the release retry and the create wait or
retry, and a create after a release makes the record again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A Compose bind volume with a Coolify `content:` block could make
Coolify write any host file (for example /root/.ssh/authorized_keys)
when the file was loaded. Content sources must now be inside the
resource directory (./ paths); other sources get a clear validation
error for services and applications (UI, API, load, deployment),
and every content write is confined again on the server. Bind
mounts without content are unchanged. All 94 template content
volumes use ./ paths and still work.
- Quote container names in scheduled tasks and in the stop actions for
applications, previews, and services.
- Fix a development-only crash when a preview with a bind mount was
parsed (the preview suffix returned a plain string).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
API log endpoints and the GetLogs UI now treat `all` as unbounded
output, with `-1` remaining as a compatibility alias. MCP still
falls back to a positive default. Traefik version checks run from
CheckForUpdatesJob instead of a weekly schedule.
Make start/stop/restart, deploy, enable/disable, and server validate
POST-only, with GET returning 405. Server validate accepts optional
install and uses ValidateAndInstallServerJob. Update OpenAPI and tests.
Expose DELETE for application, database, and service storage backup
schedules (with OpenAPI docs), reject storage deletes while schedules
exist, skip retention cleanup when no limits are set, and remove S3
archives using the execution’s S3 storage.
Normalize tag names before attaching them, reject names that are too short
after sanitization, and return 404 when removing tags not attached to the
resource.
Adds a per-team unique tag-name index and migrates duplicate tags onto the
kept record before creating the constraint.
Clamp log line counts, parse timestamp flags consistently, and filter
service subcontainers by Coolify labels. Document log endpoint timestamp
parameters and database/service log routes in OpenAPI.
Expose GitHub app secrets and file storage content only when the request has sensitive read access. Hide LocalFileVolume content by default and resolve application UUIDs from route parameters.
Only eager load nested server settings for service responses when the API token has read:sensitive, preventing read-only tokens from exposing sentinel fields while preserving sensitive access.
Add `exposeNestedServerSecrets()` to Applications, Databases, and
Services controllers so that `read:sensitive`/`root` tokens see
sentinel and logdrain fields on eager-loaded Server + ServerSetting
relations.
ServicesController handles both single models and Eloquent Collections
(listing endpoint passes a Collection per project).
Tests tightened to use JSON-key assertions (`"field":`) to avoid false
positives from field names appearing in values.
Models now declare $hidden for passwords, tokens, db URLs, and compose
fields. API controllers flip from makeHidden-on-deny to makeVisible-on-
allow (can_read_sensitive=true), fixing fields that were never hidden.
Also adds missing fields (mysql/mariadb passwords, logdrain keys, etc.)
to privileged disclosure lists.
Tests added: Feature/Security/ApiSensitiveFieldsTest and
Unit/Models/SensitiveFieldsHiddenTest cover all affected models and
controllers.
Introduce a dedicated `audit` log channel (daily rotation, configurable retention via
LOG_AUDIT_DAYS) and a small `auditLog()` / `auditLogWebhookFailure()` helper used to
record state-changing API operations and webhook events.
Instrumented:
- API mutation endpoints (create / update / delete / start / stop / restart) across
applications, services, databases (incl. backups, env vars, storage), servers,
projects + environments, scheduled tasks, private keys, GitHub apps, cloud provider
tokens, Hetzner server provisioning, instance enable/disable.
- Webhook signature verification outcomes for GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Gitea and
Stripe, plus the Sentinel push endpoint.
- Authentication and authorization outcomes via the global exception handler and
the `ApiAbility` middleware (unauthenticated, ability-denied, policy-denied).
The helper is wrapped in try/catch so logging failures never affect the request
path. Successful operations log at `info`; suspicious/denied requests log at
`warning`. Operators wanting a failures-only feed can set `LOG_AUDIT_LEVEL=warning`.
Includes a feature test suite covering the helper, the webhook providers and the
new auth/authorization log paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Andras Bacsai
