Since aabd12737 a Compose bind volume with a content block had to stay
inside the resource directory. Services and Compose applications saved
in v4.3.23 with other paths, and Git Compose files with them, no longer
started or deployed.
Only admins and owners can edit Compose files, and they can already
write any host file with a plain bind mount, so the rule added no
security.
- Write content files to their host path again, as in v4.3.23
- Keep shell escaping and the safe-character checks on volume sources,
so injection attempts are still rejected
- A Compose bind volume with a Coolify `content:` block could make
Coolify write any host file (for example /root/.ssh/authorized_keys)
when the file was loaded. Content sources must now be inside the
resource directory (./ paths); other sources get a clear validation
error for services and applications (UI, API, load, deployment),
and every content write is confined again on the server. Bind
mounts without content are unchanged. All 94 template content
volumes use ./ paths and still work.
- Quote container names in scheduled tasks and in the stop actions for
applications, previews, and services.
- Fix a development-only crash when a preview with a bind mount was
parsed (the preview suffix returned a plain string).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Andras Bacsai
